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The Menon-Žižek Debate: “The Tale of the 
(Never-marked) (But secretly coded) Universal 
and the (Always marked) Particular . . .”
Gautam Basu Thakur
Slavoj Žižek’s fi rst visit to India in 2010 saw a lively public debate between 
the Slovene philosopher and Nivedita Menon, professor at Jawaharlal Nehru 
University’s Centre for Comparative Politics and Political Theory and a lead-
ing scholar in the fi eld of postcolonial studies and feminism.1 Though Žižek’s 
debates with Alain Badiou, Judith Butler, David Horowitz, Bernard-Henri 
Lévy, and, most recently, Noam Chomsky are well known, few outside India 
are aware of the Menon-Žižek debate. This little known exchange provides 
the opportunity to consider how colonial-era Eurocentrism is returning to-
day, again, in the guise of the most radical criticisms of global capitalism. 
I say “again” since it was Gayatri Spivak who, in the mid-1980s, fi rst drew 
our attention to the underlying presence of Eurocentrism in twentieth-century 
left ist western philosophy.2 Today, aft er almost three decades (and the post-
colonial and posthumanist revolutions in the academy), any form of Euro-
centrism in western thought may appear as farce. But the presence (and the 
defense) of Eurocentrism in the writings of a western left ist intellectual such 
as Žižek is more like tragedy, for it indicates that we are yet to be completely 
rid of Eurocentrism. Menon’s critique of Žižek off ers yet another opportunity 
to analyze and to deconstruct the longstanding credo-narrative of (Europe as) 
the Universal and (or, versus) the Other-as-particular.
My aim here is not to review the Menon-Žižek debate beyond acquaint-
ing my readers with its most salient arguments. I will not take up each and 
every one of Menon’s contentions to demonstrate how these measure up vis-
à-vis the vast corpus of Žižek’s writing. Instead, the framework of complaints 
Menon raises off er points of departure for examining a few key symptomatic 
The subtitle is taken from Nivedita Menon’s comment made in her blog post titled “The 
Two Zizeks.” A version of this paper was presented at the annual convention of the Mod-
ern Language Association in Seattle on 7 January 2012. I want to thank Mark D. Stein-
berg, Dušan Bjelić, Jessie Labov, and the anonymous reviewers for their comments and 
suggestions during the revision process. I specially want to thank Jane T. Hedges for her 
meticulous reading of my manuscript. I remain indebted as well to Reshmi Mukherjee for 
her critical insights on my section on subalternity and to Meghant Sudan and Ralph Clare 
for being patient listeners.
1. The publication house Navayana invited Žižek as the chief speaker at its fi rst An-
nual Lecture Series. Founded by Ravikumar and S. Anand in 2003, Navayana is “India’s 
fi rst and only publishing house to exclusively focus on the issue of caste from anticaste 
perspective.” As part of its commitment to the public intellectual sphere in India, the An-
nual Lecture Series invites international scholars and philosophers to address issues such 
as “struggles for justice, equality and freedom.” Žižek gave four lectures on this tour: two 
in New Delhi, and one each at Hyderabad and Kochi.
2. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?,” in Cary Nelson and Law-
rence Grossberg, eds., Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture (Urbana, 1988), 271–313.
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Eurocentric moments in Žižek’s work, especially in his essay “A Left ist Plea 
for ‘Eurocentrism.’”3 In opting to critically investigate a few select texts and 
moments (including short passages, asides, and elisions) from Žižek’s long 
writing career, this article therefore does not aim to do anything more than 
mark out the contours of Eurocentrism in Žižek’s works. This is not because 
an exhaustive study of Eurocentric dispensations of Žižek’s philosophy is im-
possible to pursue, but rather because I am unwilling to constitutively delimit 
Žižek’s extensive and myriad thoughts on the relation between late capitalism 
and subjectivity as merely a product of Eurocentrism. In fact, it is not diffi  cult 
to see the intersections between Žižek’s critical methodology and that of post-
colonial studies, and this alone problematizes any overarching denomination 
of Žižek as a puerile Eurocentric thinker.4 Instead of constructing a grand nar-
rative about Žižek’s Eurocentrism, then, I have opted to identify and gloss an 
assortment of segregated moments in his works that excise the particular in 
favor of the universal, that is, Europe. Moving from one textual site to another, 
I aim to arrest these sudden, subtle ruptures only to explode them further by, 
at times, drawing connections between these and traditional Eurocentric dis-
courses and, at other times, by bringing them in dialogue with postcolonial 
criticism and the postcolonial critic.
To what purpose, one may ask? I am not interested in contesting either 
Žižek’s claim that he is Eurocentric or that his Eurocentrism is latent and thus 
in need of Freudian excavation. Instead, I agree with Hamid Dabashi’s recent 
reminder that “the question of Eurocentricism is now entirely blasé. Of course 
Europeans are Eurocentric and see the world from their vantage point.” What 
I want to emphasize in particular is how Žižek’s readings of the non-west 
truncate “the manner in which non-European thinking can [off er] alternative 
(complementary or contradictory) visions of reality more rooted in the lived 
experiences of people in Africa, in Asia, in Latin America.”5 It is this exci-
sion of the non-European’s lived reality, thinking, and being that also situates 
Žižek’s views on postcolonial studies, which for him is nothing more than a 
contemporary fad for feel-good multicultural identity politics, in the tradition 
of Euro centric thinking.6
3. Slavoj Žižek, “A Left ist Plea for ‘Eurocentrism,’” Critical Inquiry 24, no. 4 (Summer 
1998): 988–1009.
4. Ian Almond, “Anti-Capitalist Objections to the Postcolonial: Some Conciliatory Re-
marks on Žižek and Context,” Ariel: A Review of International English Literature 43, no. 1 
(January 2012): 1–21.
5. Hamid Dabashi, “Can Non-Europeans Think? What Happens with Thinkers Who 
Operate outside the European Philosophical ‘Pedigree’?” Al Jazeera, 15 January 2013, at 
www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/01/2013114142638797542.html (last accessed 
19 July 2013).
6. See, for example, his interview with Katie Engelhart, “Slavoj Žižek: I Am Not the 
World’s Hippest Philosopher!” Salon, 29 December 2012, at www.salon.com/2012/12/29/
slavoj_zizek_i_am_not_the_worlds_hippest_philosopher/ (last accessed 19 July 2013). 
For Žižek’s take on postcolonialism as “feel-good multicultural identity politics,” see 
Sandro Mezzadra and Federico Rahola, “The Postcolonial Condition: A Few Notes on the 
Quality of Historical Time in the Global Present,” Postcolonial Text 2, no. 1 (2006), at www.
postcolonial.org/index.php/pct/article/view/393/819 (last accessed 19 July 2013).
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The Menon-Žižek Debate
The elements of the debate included Menon’s offi  cial response to Žižek’s lec-
ture in New Delhi titled “Tragedy and Farce” and Žižek’s lengthy rejoinder 
to Menon at the same venue. Discussions about this exchange subsequently 
gathered steam in the blogosphere aft er Menon posted an essay-length en-
try in Kafi la, a scholarly blog, detailing her objections to Žižek’s work.7 Titled 
“The Two Zizeks,” her blog post contends that Žižek’s emphasis on European, 
Christian universalism as the most proactive model for countering global cap-
italism is dangerously ignorant of the heteroglossiac postcolonial histories of 
South Asia. This, in turn, leads Menon to characterize Žižek’s discourse as 
part of that European intellectual tradition, which, while claiming to privi-
lege all, reconstructs the (old) narrative of “the (Never-marked) (But secretly 
coded) Universal and the (Always marked) [, and as such, always failing to 
accede to the Universal] Particular.”8
Menon’s critique of Žižek consists of fi ve points: Christianity, feminism, 
colonialism, the state, and universalism.
Christianity: Menon fi nds Žižek’s introduction of Christianity into a left -
ist revolutionary politics and rhetoric problematic. She neither agrees with 
Žižek’s theory that the “singular universalism of communism” is “necessar-
ily Christian” nor with his claim that Christianity is free from the restrictive 
cultural particularities of other religions. Such claims, she notes, see the Kan-
tian Enlightenment project as universal by ignoring postcolonial reservations 
about its universality.
Feminism: For Menon, Žižek’s critique of contemporary (American) femi-
nism as merely identity politics seems ignorant of the various Third World 
feminist movements. She argues that the characters and dispensations of 
these other feminist movements are very diff erent from the white, elitist, 
upper-class American feminism that Žižek criticizes. Consequently, she con-
demns Žižek’s clubbing of diff erent feminisms and feminist movements into 
one singular set as yet another universalizing gesture on his part.
Colonialism: Žižek’s insistence on reading colonialism as progressive is, in 
Menon’s view, nothing short of appalling. She loathes the argument that colo-
nialism was responsible for rescuing non-European societies from “repressive 
traditions” through the introduction of modernity (and modernization).9 For 
7. Nivedita Menon, “The Two Zizeks” (7 January 2010), Kafi la, at kafi la.org/2010/01/07/
the-two-zizeks/ (last accessed 19 July 2013). Kafi la is a blog site with diff erence. Theirs is a 
“collaborative practice . . . of concerned individuals—scholars, activists, writers, journal-
ists—to create a space for critical engagement on a wide range of issues of the contempo-
rary world” separate and free from the “mediatized” spaces of public discourse.
8. Emphasis added. We do not have the text of Žižek’s talk available to us. Currently 
some videos of the lecture are available for viewing on YouTube. This paper relies primar-
ily on Menon’s written text and, to a lesser extent, on the videos. While reading Menon’s 
piece, it is helpful to keep in mind that her response is not just based on Žižek’s talk (or 
his book First as Tragedy, Then as Farce [London, 2009]) but off ers a general reaction to 
his writings overall.
9. Menon is referring to Žižek’s argument in First as Tragedy, Then as Farce that “Brit-
ish colonization of India created the conditions for the double liberation of India: from the 
constraints of its own tradition as well as from colonization itself” (116). For Žižek’s opti-
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her, this view is devoid of any substantial analysis of the complex problems of 
colonialism and postcolonial modernity. In turn, she emphasizes another set 
of postcolonial responses that reject the entire western tradition as “not just 
contingently fl awed, but constitutively fl awed.”10
The State: Menon has a foundational disagreement with Žižek’s argu-
ment that the ultimate goal of revolutionary politics is the usurpation of state 
power. She fi nds the theory of assuming state power in order to make the state 
function in a “non-statal” way thoroughly impractical. For her, the “state is 
fully integrated into the network of capitalist social relations, which is why 
every Marxist revolutionary take-over of the state in the 20th century eventu-
ally ended up building capitalism.”11
Universalism: In Menon’s view, all the above diffi  culties emerge from 
Žižek’s Eurocentrism, where “Kant is forever the pure philosopher of universal-
ity” and all particularities resistant to or critical of Eurocentric, Christian uni-
versalism deviants interpellated by the poisonous logic of global capital.12
We should keep in mind, however, that Žižek’s Eurocentrism is “only the 
most stark symptom of a wider syndrome” besetting the western philosopher 
for whom, as Aditya Nigam recently observed, philosophy is “always-already 
Western.”13 Or, as Spivak famously noted in “Can the Subaltern Speak?,” west-
ern episteme is driven by a “desire to conserve the subject of the West [and 
the] West as subject.”14 Though it is beyond the scope of this article to address 
the “wider syndrome,” my argument can be also read as unraveling the gen-
eral Eurocentric structure of western epistemology through an examination of 
its most recent, most complex, and most vituperative manifestation in Žižek’s 
writings.
The Tale of Two Žižeks
What plagues Žižek, as Menon sees it, is his fantasy of Žižek. Žižek wants to 
be Žižek, and we are caught unawares in the middle of this drama of “having” 
and “becoming”: “There’s the Žižek whose analysis and critique of capitalism, 
mistic view of colonialism, see Slavoj Žižek, First as Tragedy, Then as Farce, 116–18. To the 
story of Margaret Thatcher’s reception by the Chinese premier in 1985, as given by Žižek 
in the book, one should counterpose the story of David Cameron’s visit to China in 2010 
where he and members of his delegation wore Remembrance Day poppies in their jacket 
lapels! When the “Chinese offi  cials asked that they remove them, since they considered 
these poppies “inappropriate,” Cameron “refused to back down [and] followed this refusal 
with a lecture on human rights.” As Robert Young puts it, if Cameron’s refusal echoed the 
“famous incident when the British ambassador Earl McCartney refused to kowtow before 
the Emperor in 1793,” then his violent defense of human rights was the “historical irony 
[that] was apparent to all but himself.” See Robert Young, “Postcolonial Remains,” New 
Literary History 43, no. 1 (Winter 2012): 19–42.
10. Menon, “The Two Zizeks.” Emphasis in the original.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Aditya Nigam, “End of Postcolonialism and the Challenge for ‘Non-European’ 
Thought,” Critical Encounters: A Forum of Critical Thought from the Global South, 19 
May 2013, at www.criticalencounters.net/2013/05/19/end-of-postcolonialism-and-the-
challenge-for-non-european-thought/ (last accessed 7 August 2013).
14. Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?,” 271.
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free market logic, capitalist media, and American imperialism, are dazzling 
and exhilarating. . . . Beguiled by this . . . you don’t notice that you’re being led 
deeper and deeper into a dark alley, till you realize with a sudden shock, that 
waiting with a smug smile at the end of it, twirling his mustachios, casually 
tapping his bludgeon against a beefy palm, is that tough guy—20th century 
Marxism.”15 Captivated by the fi rst we overlook another Žižek—the one who 
“proceeds to spell out a radical Left  politics constituted explicitly by . . . a 
Universalism that is surreptitiously coded as European and Christian,” resur-
recting in the process the strong-arm of twentieth-century Marxism.16
In contrast to Menon, however, I do not think that there are two Žižeks. 
The exhilarating critiques of capitalism and the promise of a “heterogeneous 
communism located in and arising from the experiences of diff erent kinds of 
communities all over the world” articulated by the fi rst Žižek are, in my opin-
ion, conditional upon the rules laid out by the pronouncements of the second 
Žižek.17 As such, the apparent opposition between the two Žižeks identifi ed 
by Menon must be dissolved in favor of a Žižek whose critical evaluation of 
global capitalism needs to be read alongside his Eurocentrism, and vice versa. 
For, as Dabashi notes, the notion that “European” philosophy as opposed to 
“ethnophilosophies of the East” is most equipped to interrogate the phenom-
ena of globalism arises from the “phantom memories of the time” when “‘the 
West’ had . . . a sense of its own universalism and globality. . . . There is thus 
a direct and unmitigated structural link between an empire, or an imperial 
frame of reference, and the presumed universality of a thinker thinking in 
the bosoms of that empire.”18 As far as Žižek is a universal (read European) 
thinker, he too is deeply imbricated in that imperial frame of mind that makes 
his “particular thinking” universal and transforms “his philosophy” into the 
“Philosophy.”19
Thus for me Žižek’s views on “communism” do not merely articulate the 
specter of twentieth-century Marxism but also of European colonialism. Con-
sidering that Žižek holds European modernity as a norm that must be uni-
versally accepted and colonialism as the progressive historical vector that 
“brought this modernity to benighted and backward societies”—liberated 
south Asia “from the constraints of its own tradition as well as from colo-
nization itself”—the specter materializing for me at the end of a seductive 
journey with Žižek is of Thomas Babington Macaulay and his ilk.20 In Žižek’s 
pronouncements, one hears an echo of Macaulay’s patronizing declaration: 
“a single shelf of a good European library [is] worth the whole native literature 
of India and Arabia.”21 Macaulay believed in the unquestionable superiority 
of west European/British modernity and considered it a duty to civilize the 
brutes: “The languages of Western Europe civilized Russia, I cannot doubt 
15. Menon, “The Two Zizeks.”
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Dabashi, “Can Non-Europeans Think?”
19. Ibid.
20. See, Menon, “The Two Zizeks”; Žižek, First as Tragedy, Then as Farce, 116.
21. Thomas Babington Macaulay, “Indian Education, The Minute of the 2nd of Febru-
ary, 1835,” in Macaulay: Prose and Poetry, selected by G. M. Young (London, 1952), 722.
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that they will do for the Hindoo what they have done for the Tartar.”22 Whether 
we contemplate the dangers of twentieth-century Marxism or nineteenth-
 century colonialism, the route from “civilizing the brutes” to exterminating 
them is a short one.23 This can happen, and has happened—in the ghettos 
and the gulags, in fi ction and edicts of law, as well as in colonial institutions 
of higher learning.
Yet the similarity between the colonial bureaucrat and the twenty-fi rst 
century European philosopher does not end here. Nor is the association a 
whim. For both Macaulay and Žižek have their list of “good” books to aid 
their defi nition of the universal and facilitate their dismissal of the provin-
cial. Armed with his set of “good” European books of morals, literature, and 
sciences, Macaulay dismissed the entire vernacular production of India and 
Arabia.24 Surely, at least for some of us, memories of this attitude are revived 
when Žižek lists the subject matter of his good books (including but not lim-
ited to Greek democracy, the French Revolution, Robespierre and the Reign of 
Terror, Immanuel Kant, G. W. F. Hegel, and St. Paul)—books that foreground 
and defend a “European legacy” for one and all. Consider for instance Žižek’s 
passionate take on the death of Europe:
One oft en hears that the true message of the Eurozone crisis is that not only 
the Euro, but the project of the united Europe itself is dead. But before en-
dorsing this general statement, one should add a Leninist twist to it: Europe 
is dead—OK, but which Europe? The answer is: the post-political Europe of 
accommodation to the world market, the Europe which was repeatedly re-
jected at referendums, the Brussels technocratic-expert Europe. The Europe 
that presents itself as standing for cold European reason against Greek pas-
sion and corruption, for mathematics against pathetics. But, utopian as it 
may appear, the space is still open for another Europe: a re-politicized Eu-
rope, founded on a shared emancipatory project; the Europe that gave birth 
to ancient Greek democracy, to the French and October Revolutions. This is 
why one should avoid the temptation to react to the ongoing fi nancial crisis 
with a retreat to fully sovereign nation-states, easy prey for free-fl oating in-
ternational capital, which can play one state against the other. More than 
ever, the reply to every crisis should be more internationalist and universal-
ist than the universality of global capital.25
22. Ibid., 724.
23. Here I am referring to the document prepared by Mr. Kurtz on behalf of the In-
ternational Society for the Suppression of Savage Customs. The document ends with the 
words: exterminate all the brutes. See Joseph Conrad, Heart of Darkness, ed. Paul Arm-
strong (New York, 2006 [1899]).
24. Macaulay, “Indian Education,” 729. European books, Homi Bhabha tells us, served 
a slew of critical functions in the colonial world. On the one hand, books worked alongside 
brute force as central ideological signifi ers in the constitution of docile colonized subjects. 
On the other hand, books, especially The Book, reasserted control over the volatile Other 
space through the repetition of textual authority as the sign and support of European au-
thority. See Homi Bhabha, “Signs Taken for Wonders,” The Location of Culture (London, 
2004), 145–74. For a detailed analysis of the British colonial project of introducing English 
in India, see Gauri Vishwanathan, Masks of Conquest: Literary Study and British Rule in 
India (New York, 1989).
25. Slavoj Žižek, “Permanent Economic Emergency,” New Left  Review 64 (July– 
August 2010), 86.
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This has been one of Žižek’s long-standing arguments—defend the “European 
Legacy” through a reinvention of Europe. In Iraq: The Borrowed Kettle, “Per-
manent Economic Emergency,” and “Defenders of the Faith,” to name a few 
instances, he variously voices this demand that Europe reinvent itself through 
a marriage between Marxism (revised for the twenty-fi rst century) and the 
Europe that “gave birth to ancient Greek democracy, to the French and Octo-
ber Revolutions” and atheism.26 For what reason, one may ask? Žižek himself 
off ers a most pointed answer to this in Iraq: The Borrowed Kettle:
For many years, I have pleaded for a renewed “left ist Eurocentrism.” To put 
it bluntly: do we want to live in a world in which the only choice is between 
the American civilization and the emerging Chinese authoritarian-capitalist 
one? If the answer is no, then the true alternative is Europe. The Third World 
cannot generate a strong enough resistance to the ideology of the American 
Dream; in the present constellation, only Europe can do that. The true op-
position today is not between the First and Third World, but between the 
ensemble of First and Third Worlds (the American global Empire and its colo-
nies) and the remaining Second World (Europe).27
While it is true that many of us would not want to choose between liv-
ing under an American empire or a Chinese one, it is equally true that many 
of us would also not choose Europe. If we overlook for the moment Žižek’s 
claims that Europe is the true alternative or that the Third World is incapable 
of resisting the American dream, the question remains: what is this Europe 
that Žižek is talking about? It is not surprising that discerning minds fi nd 
Žižek’s reinvented, (re)imagined Europe thoroughly fanciful. Nikolay Karkov, 
among others, has recently questioned this idea of “Europe.” Writing in re-
sponse to Žižek’s prioritization of a symbolic Europe over the real(ity) of the 
Balkans, Karkov draws on the works of Martin Bernal, Henry Olela, and En-
rique Dussel, to deconstruct the myth of a unifi ed Europe. From the very be-
ginning, this idea of Europe has been “a liberal mixture [of] fact and fi ction,” 
he notes.28 Similarly, and to expand Karkov’s argument, others might equally 
object to the evacuation of global historical memory from the symbolic space 
of Europe in this process of reinventing Europe as the cradle of civilization. 
Evidently geopolitical spaces are symbolic universes encoded with imagi-
nary signifi ers of belonging, dispossession, and sacrifi ce. Even then, is such 
a radical erasing of global memory possible? Can it be expected of the peoples 
of the erstwhile colonized countries to welcome this new Europe—a Europe 
that does not count among its long-lasting legacies the history of coloniza-
tion (and its continued persecution of immigrant minorities from the global 
south)? Or, worse still, can we really accept a Europe that claims colonial-
26. See Slavoj Žižek, Iraq: The Borrowed Kettle (London, 2004), 35–36; Žižek, “Perma-
nent Economic Emergency,” 85; Žižek, “Defenders of the Faith,” New York Times, 12 March 
2006, at www.nytimes.com/2006/03/12/opinion/12zizek.html?_r=0 (last accessed 19 July 
2013).
27. Žižek, Iraq, 32–33.
28. Nikolay Karkov, “Balkan Ghosts, Western Specters, and the Politics of Location: 
The Case of Slavoj Žižek,” Psychoanalysis, Culture, and Society 16, no. 3 (September 2011): 
291–98.
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ism is progressive and reparative!? My argument is not just that Žižek fails to 
consider the non-European character of the ancient Greek civilizations or the 
contributions of Muslim Spain to the Enlightenment, but that his Europe is a 
violent creation. Like Mohandas Gandhi whom Žižek chastises for unleashing 
structural violence on the colonized populace of India (a point Rabindranath 
Tagore noted long before Žižek), Žižek’s Europe violates the history and cul-
tural memories of postcolonial nations as well as many nations within Eu-
rope.29 In “Defenders of the Faith,” Žižek pleads for “restoring the dignity of 
atheism, one of Europe’s greatest legacies” as “our only chance for peace.” But 
is peace possible unless advocates of this new Europe are also willing to in-
clude colonialism in the list of Europe’s lasting criminal legacies?30 The story 
of European modernity is incomplete unless the predicament of the enslaved 
colonized living at the mercy of the so-called bliss of Greek/European democ-
racy is narrated. Similarly, the narratives celebrating the universal emanci-
patory disposition of Marxism-Leninism are inadequate unless, to give one 
example, the struggles of South Asian communists who fought tooth and nail 
with Vladimir Lenin during the Second Congress to articulate a “communist 
position vis-à-vis colonialism” are chronicled.31 Retrieving the hidden and si-
lenced histories of the non-European is one of the primary tasks undertaken 
by postcolonial studies. This is done, however, not just to claim recognition, 
but also to restore the true character of European modernity—modernity “to 
which the ‘excluded barbarians’ have contributed, although their contribu-
tion has not been acknowledged.”32
An interesting case in point is the debate between M. N. Roy and Lenin at 
the Second World Congress of the Communist International. Roy, an Indian-
Bengali with ties to the extremist revolutionary movement in colonial Bengal, 
objected to Lenin’s position on the relationship between the communist move-
29. For Žižek on Gandhi, see The Universal Exception (New York, 2006), 222–23. 
See also, Adam Kirsch, “Žižek Strikes Again,” New Republic, 26 July 2010, at www.
newrepublic.com/article/books-and-arts/76531/slavoj-zzek-philosophy-gandhi# (last ac-
cessed 19 July 2013), and Shobhan Saxena, “First They Called Me a Joker, Now I Am a 
Dangerous Thinker,” Times of India, 10 January 2010, at articles.timesofi ndia.indiatimes.
com/2010-01-10/all-that-matters/28120874_1_buddhism-political-violence-philosopher 
(last  accessed 19 July 2013). For Tagore on Gandhi, see The Mahatma and the Poet: Letters 
and Debates between Gandhi and Tagore, 1915–1941, comp. and ed. Sabyasachi Bhattacha-
rya (New Delhi, 1997).
30. Žižek “Defenders of the Faith.”
31. See Robert Young, Postcolonialism: A Historical Introduction (Oxford, 2001).
32. I am inferring this defi nition of modernity from Enrique Dussel’s argument that 
modernity must be reconceptualized as transmodernity, that is, not strictly a “European 
but a planetary phenomenon, to which the ‘excluded barbarians’ have contributed, al-
though their contribution has not been acknowledged.” See Walter Mignolo, “The Geo-
politics of Knowledge and the Colonial Diff erence,” in Mabel Moraña, Enrique Dussel, and 
Carlos A. Jáuregui, eds., Coloniality at Large: Latin America and the Postcolonial Debate 
(Durham, 2008), 225–26. Put diff erently, the move toward modernity as inclusive rather 
than exclusive can be rephrased in the words of Edward Said as moving from a unitary, 
singular identity of the Self (as opposed to the Other) to an identity that includes the Other 
“without suppressing the diff erence[s]” particular to the Other. See Said, “On Oriental-
ism,” www.youtube.com/watch?v=vdE18HdfanI&feature=related (last accessed 19 July 
2013).
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ment and nationalist movements in colonial countries. The primary points 
of contention revolved around two major issues: fi rst, whether revolutionary 
movements in the colonies should align with the bourgeois-nationalist anti-
colonial movements (the movement led by Gandhi in India, for example); sec-
ond, whether communist movements in Asian colonies should be allowed to 
lead the worldwide revolution. Lenin was in favor of the fi rst and opposed to 
the second. Roy, distrustful of the bourgeois leaders of the Indian National 
Congress, opposed Lenin on both counts. He advocated against forming al-
liances with the colonial bourgeois-nationalists while emphasizing the need 
to give the colonies the lead in the revolutionary movement. The stalemate 
ended only when he and Lenin agreed to a compromise, leading to the writ-
ing of the “Theses on the National and Colonial Questions” by Lenin and the 
“Supplementary Theses” by Roy.33
This debate is ample proof of the role that “Third World” intellectuals 
have historically played in shaping European modernity and thus a reason for 
not abandoning hope in the “Third World’s” potential to mount a challenge 
against global capitalism today. It is also important to note that Žižek’s plea 
for retrieving “the Lenin-in-becoming,” that is, “the Lenin whose fundamen-
tal experience was that of being thrown into a catastrophic new constellation 
in which old coordinates proved useless and who was thus compelled to rein-
vent Marxism,” stands affi  rmed rather than compromised through the inclu-
sion of this history of the non-European’s contribution to Lenin’s thought. The 
excision of this history, however, whether by ignorance or design, is symp-
tomatic of a desire to overlook historical facts in order to construct and claim 
a myth of European modernity as essentially “European” in provenance.34 
When speaking of origins, it is imperative that we focus on documenting, ac-
centuating, and reviving the role played by the non-European Other in both 
constituting and challenging European modernity. Put diff erently, the non-
European has exerted and continues to exert a constitutive presence in the 
cultural and ideological map of Europe. And this Other’s inextricable pres-
ence is best evidenced in the need to reassert the privilege of Europe over the 
provincial Other.
Who’s Afraid of Eurocentrism? Žižek Writes Back
Žižek is not unaware of the problems that the use of words such as Eurocen-
trism and Eurocentric raise today. In “A Left ist Plea for ‘Eurocentrism,’” he 
writes: “When one says Eurocentrism, every self-respecting postmodern left -
ist intellectual has as violent a reaction as Joseph Goebbels had to culture—to 
reach for a gun, hurling accusations of protofascist Eurocentrist cultural 
imperialism.”35 Yet this canny circumspection makes way for a more self-
righteous voice in his debate with William David Hart, who in his “Slavoj 
Žižek and the Imperial/Colonial Model of Religion” accuses Žižek of being 
33. See Young, Postcolonialism, 131–34.
34. Slavoj Žižek, “A Plea for Leninist Intolerance,” Critical Inquiry 28, No. 2 (Winter 
2002): 553.
35. Žižek, “Left ist Plea for ‘Eurocentrism,’” 988.
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incorrigibly Eurocentric. Žižek’s response to Hart was published in the same 
issue of Nepantla. Hart’s counterresponse appeared in the following issue.36 
A detailed discussion of Hart and Žižek’s arguments, responses, and counter-
arguments is not possible here. But parts of their exchange, especially from 
Žižek’s response to Hart, are worth citing at length.
Žižek begins his rebuff  by saying: “[Hart is] knocking on an open door: 
I directly and openly claim what he is trying to unearth through a critical 
analysis. I who openly designate myself as ‘Eurocentrist,’ who explicitly ar-
gue for the unique position of the Judeo-Christian tradition, am reproached—
for what? For my ‘Eurocentrism’ and for privileging the Judeo-Christian tradi-
tion.” He continues,
To put it quite brutally: Does Hart really think I am not acquainted with every 
line of his argumentation? What he does is simply retell the old story of how 
the Hegelian narrative of the dialectical progress of religious consciousness, 
which culminates in Christianity, the only true religion of freedom, served 
as the ideological legitimization of Western colonialism. What is missing in 
Hart’s story is Hegel himself, what already Marx referred to as the revolution-
ary kernel of Hegel’s dialectics. That is to say, if Hart’s story were the whole 
story, then Hegel would be just a racist ideologue of capitalist colonialism. 
And, if this is all Hart sees in Hegel, then one cannot but apply to him Hegel’s 
dictum on how Evil resides in the very gaze which perceives Evil everywhere: 
it is Hart himself whose gaze is constrained to the colonialist lenses, and is 
thus unable to discern the tremendous emancipatory potential of Hegel’s 
thought. That Hegel’s philosophy is part of modern Western history, inclu-
sive of colonialism, is, of course, a commonplace barely worth mentioning. 
What is much more diffi  cult to grasp is how this same “Eurocentric colonial-
ist” philosophy provided the ultimate subversive intellectual tools that allow 
us to discern and question this very “Eurocentric colonialist” bias.37
As I read it, Žižek’s defense/counterargument is built around three salient 
moments: (1) Hart is “knocking on an open door”—Žižek is openly declaring 
himself Eurocentric. (2) If Hart is correct, then Hegel is “just a racist ideologue 
of capitalist colonialism” and not a foundational fi gure of European moder-
nity. (3) How, then, does Hart explain that the “same ‘Eurocentric colonialist’ 
philosophy” that he criticizes also provides him and others like him with “the 
ultimate subversive intellectual tools . . . to discern and question this very 
‘Eurocentric colonialist’ bias” in European writings (beginning with Hegel 
and culminating, at this stage, in Žižek)? Simply put, is not “the ‘postcolonial’ 
critique of Eurocentrism[,] in its intellectual background and the tools it mo-
bilizes, a ‘Eurocentric’ endeavor par excellence”?38
Each point and question raised by Žižek is important and valid; but these 
have been already raised, debated, and, more or less, put to rest in last few 
36. See William David Hart, “Slavoj Žižek and the Imperial/Colonial Model of Reli-
gion,” Nepantla: Views from South 3, no. 3 (2002): 553–78; Slavoj Žižek, “I Plead Guilty—
But Where Is the Judgment?,” Nepantla: Views from South 3, no. 3 (2002): 579–83; William 
David Hart, “Can a Judgment Be Read? A Response to Slavoj Žižek,” Nepantla: Views from 
South 4, no. 1 (2003): 191–94.
37. Žižek, “I Plead Guilty,” 579–80.
38. Ibid., 580.
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decades of the twentieth century.39 Although there is no harm in bringing 
these questions back, it is nothing if not a tragedy bordering on farce that 
postcolonial critics are called on, again and again, to explain what they do. In 
any case, let me attempt to give brief answers to Žižek’s arguments above.
Žižek says Hart is knocking on an open door since he has openly declared 
himself to be Eurocentric. That is, as Žižek sees it, should this confession not 
be enough to stop people from pointing the fi nger at Žižek? Hart disagrees: “A 
forthright acknowledgment that one is a Eurocentrist is hardly an argument 
for Eurocentrism. It is merely a confession. This confession may be good for 
Žižek’s soul. It may be a way for him to hold his ethical-political commitments 
and the remnants of his religious commitments in a unifi ed vision. Whether 
it is good for ‘us,’ however, is an ethical and political question, which has to 
be put to a historical, empirical, and theoretical test.”40 Risking abstraction, 
I would like to add another point to Hart’s reply. Namely, which “door” is 
Žižek is talking about? Is not the problem with Eurocentrism (and colonial 
discourse) precisely in its attribution of meaning and sovereignty to objects, 
bodies, and systems of thought in complete ignorance of the colonized’s/non-
European’s symbolic systems?
Žižek’s second point is about Hegel’s place in modernity. The question is 
whether postcolonial critics are denying Hegel his due. Or, for that matter, 
if they are asking to do away with European philosophy completely. Indeed 
some are. Walter D. Mignolo and Aditya Nigam, for instance, are against re-
lying on the “guiding lights” of western philosophy. As Nigam observes, “a 
contemporary non-European thinker or scholar might prefer to engage with 
her own times . . . without the necessary mediation of Western philosophy 
or thought; she might fi nd, as many indeed do, the elaborate invocation of 
the (Western) philosophical pantheon before embarking on any journey of 
thought, irrelevant if not positively irritating. S/he may not fi nd discourses on 
‘communism’ and the ‘truth of the proletariat’—as in the thought of a Slavoj 
Žižek or an Alain Badiou—relevant at all to her condition.” Nigam advocates 
instead a “withdrawal, a stepping back, from entering into ‘a dialogue’ with 
Western philosophers, the terms for which are always-already set for us.”41 
Similarly, Mignolo, responding to the recent exchanges between Santiago Za-
bala and Hamid Dabashi in Al Jazeera, notes, “My readings of continental phi-
losophy are not in search of guiding lights to deal with issues of non- European 
histories. . . . I spend most of my time engaged with non-European thinkers. It 
is from the light and guidance I’ve found in non-European thinkers that, when 
necessary, I engage with European philosophers.”42 Others, like Spivak, urge 
a more comprehensive engagement with European philosophy to fully exca-
vate its foundations, however. For this latter group the task is that of under-
39. For a recent “postcolonial” reading of this postcolonial conundrum, see Nigam, 
“End of Postcolonialism.”
40. Hart, “Can a Judgment Be Read?,” 191.
41. Nigam “End of Postcolonialism.”
42. Walter Mignolo, “Yes, We Can: Non-European Thinkers and Philosophers.” Al 
Jazeera, 19 February 2013, at www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/02/20132672747
320891.html (last accessed 30 August 2013). Emphasis added.
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lining what remains undocumented in western discourses of European phi-
losophy where discussions of Kant as the “pure philosopher of universality” 
remains conveniently divorced from discussions of Kant as the anthropolo-
gist, with his pseudo-scientifi c theories about “racial diff erence.”43 This other 
Kant stands a better chance of being discovered (as has indeed been the case) 
through the writings of postcolonial scholars. As Spivak notes in response to 
critics who found fault with her treatment of Kant in A Critique of Postcolonial 
Reason:
I am not looking at Kant writing about perpetual peace, about the ethical 
state . . . not when he gives us cosmopolitheia, but rather where he is teaching 
us how to solve the most central problem of philosophy and in description of 
philosophizing shows an extraordinary disrespect for the Fourth World, the 
Aboriginal. That is the way I read as a literary critic. I look at the “marginal” 
moment that unravels the text; paradoxically, it gives us a sense of what is 
“normal” for the text, what norms the text.44
Postcolonial critics are therefore focusing on Hegel or Kant’s racism not sim-
ply to prove that they were racist ideologues who should thus be banished 
from the course of study. On the contrary, these critics are insisting on a 
more rigorous examination of European philosophy and modernity in rela-
tion to colonialism and imperialism. The point variously made by Spivak or 
Mignolo is that European modernity is inseparable from European colonial-
ism: “Coloniality [is] constitutive of [Enlightenment European] modernity.”45 
Consequently there are not two Kants, two Hegels, and two Žižeks, but Øne. 
As long as modernity remains a purely European phenomenon, there is only 
Øne philosopher, the western philosopher, and One philosophy—that is, 
western philosophy.46 Yes, we know that Žižek knows about the ideological 
collusion between Hegel’s Spirit (of History) and colonial discourse. What is 
being questioned instead is the foreclosure (Verwerfung) of the possibility of 
reconceptualizing modernity as transmodernity, that is, modernity not as a 
“European but a planetary phenomenon,” and European modernity as rooted 
in colonialism.47
But what of Žižek’s claim that evil resides in the eye of the beholder? That 
43. Menon, “The Two Zizeks.”
44. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “In Response: Looking Back, Looking Forward,” in 
Rosalind C. Morris, ed., Refl ections on the History of an Idea: Can the Subaltern Speak? 
(New York, 2010), 228–29.
45. Mignolo, “Geopolitics of Knowledge,” 229.
46. My use of the barred One here refers to Lacan’s theory of the barred Other, which 
designates the symbolic order as barred, incomplete, or inconsistent. If western European 
philosophy is an impermeable symbolic order, a totality, an absolute, then Žižek is cor-
rect: one is either with it or opposed to it. My point here is to argue against such biased, 
fundamentalist notions privileging the fantasy of Europe as a totality.
47. Mignolo, “Geopolitics of Knowledge,” 225–26. I use the Freudian term Verwerfung 
to defi ne foreclosure in the terms delineated by Lacan in his Seminars, that is, as the refus-
ing or repudiation of a signifi cant signifi er along with its aff ects from the symbolic order. 
In the specifi c context of Eurocentrism, what is being categorically rejected from construc-
tions of a European symbolic order is the idea that the non-west may have contributed to 
European modernity or that the west has been built on the slave labor of the non-west.
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it is “us” who are guilty of feeding off  European intellectual traditions and 
then turning around to criticize those very traditions? This accusation, again, 
is not new. Third World postcolonial critics in the United States are always 
charged with defending their literal and intellectual positions—they speak 
from the so-called academic center and in European languages.48 But does 
this situation not illustrate the impossibility of transcending the structures 
of global capitalism that were fi rst put in place during the European coloniza-
tion of the global south? The irony lies in how the invitation to identity that 
was fi rst extended by the likes of Macaulay is now being rephrased to ask: 
what are you doing in my home? Why are you using my language? To these 
questions I respond with the words of Chinua Achebe: “I have been given 
this language and I intend to use it.”49 I will confess as well that I intend to 
use this language to interrogate Europe, but this act is not tantamount to, as 
Veena Das once observed, a “rejection of western categories.” Rather it signals 
“the beginning of a new and autonomous relation” between Europe and its 
Other(s).50 Let me also add a caveat here by noting that my use of “your” lan-
guage is diff erent from your use of “your” language as far as you did not teach 
me to challenge you in your language. To presume that the European intellec-
tual tradition has allowed us to deconstruct the very structures of Eurocentric 
discourses is a  self-serving fallacy. Quite the contrary, “we” have used the 
inherited language to illuminate the structural inconsistencies and violent 
dispensations of Europe’s language—its textualizations of the colony as well 
as the postcolony—via a wide array of reading strategies including but not 
limited to deliberate misreadings and by accentuating what remains veiled 
in Eurocentric presentations of an exclusive “European” modernity. Post-
colonial scholars openly acknowledge these strategies. Consider for instance 
Spivak’s announcement in A Critique of Postcolonial Reason prior to her (mis)
reading of Kant that,
I will call my reading of Kant “mistaken.” I believe there are just disciplinary 
grounds for irritation at my introduction of “the empirical and the anthro-
pological” into a philosophical text that slowly leads us toward the rational 
study of morals as such. I rehearse it in the hope that such a reading might 
take into account that philosophy has been and continues to be travestied 
in the service of the narrativization of history. My exercise may be called a 
scrupulous travesty in the interest of producing a counternarrative that will 
make visible the foreclosure of the subject whose lack of access to the posi-
tion of narrator is the condition of possibility of the consolidation of Kant’s 
position.51
48. See, for example, Rajeswari Sunder Rajan, “The Third World Academic in Other 
Places; Or, the Postcolonial Intellectual Revisited,” Critical Inquiry 23, no. 3 (Spring 1997): 
596–616.
49. See Chinua Achebe’s essay “The African Writer and the English Language,” Morn-
ing Yet on Creation Day (New York, 1975). Spivak has also said on a number of occasions 
that to question why postcolonial critics write and speak in Europe’s “languages” is to 
deny the historical role of colonialism on postcolonial consciousness.
50. Veena Das, “Subaltern as Perspective,” in Ranajit Guha, ed., Subaltern Studies 
(New Delhi, 1989), 6:310.
51. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Towards a History 
of the Vanishing Present (London, 1999), 9.
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And what stands articulated at the end of this valuable and carefully craft ed 
misreading? It is the fi gure of the otherwise excised racialized other in Kant—
the other whose deletion in Kant operates to defi ne the fi gure of the rational 
(Kantian) subject.52
Žižek’s “Plea” and the Question of the Subaltern
“A Left ist Plea for ‘Eurocentrism’” authorizes a theory of universal sociopo-
litical identity by ignoring and overwriting the plurality of the Other. Read-
ing this essay as Spivak reads Kant, that is, by focusing on the marginal, the 
absences that constitute and unravel the text while dispensing a sense of the 
“normal” or the norm, my aim is to draw out the limitations of Žižek’s univer-
sal qua the question of the subaltern. Žižek’s theory of “politics proper” in the 
essay presents politics as a confl ict between aristocracy or oligarchy and the 
subordinate social other. He defi nes “politics proper” as “a phenomenon that 
appeared for the fi rst time in ancient Greece when the members of the demos 
(those with no fi rmly determined place in the hierarchical social edifi ce) pre-
sented themselves as the representatives, the stand-ins, for the whole of soci-
ety, for the true universality.”53 A part of the nonpart stood up against the rul-
ing aristocracy or oligarchy to demand recognition as the true representatives 
of society. According to Žižek, this conscious articulation of representation 
constitutes the “elementary gesture of politicization,” and “the struggle for 
one’s voice to be heard and recognized as that of a legitimate partner” is “poli-
tics proper.”54 My question is how his template of “politics proper” presumes 
to represent the subalterns from the global south or those who have a position 
but no identity in society?
I am zeroing in on the subaltern as this is the nodal point of the particular 
Other and as such most completely grounds the central premise of postcolonial 
studies, that is, reviewing coloniality via the Other’s identity-in- diff erence. In 
the immediate context of this essay, the category of the subaltern is also of 
utmost importance since it forces us to “think anew the relation between” 
Europe and the rest of the world “from a point of view that displaces the 
central position of [Europe] as the subject of discourse and [the Other] as its 
object.”55
The subaltern, Spivak explains, is best identifi ed by its position without 
identity in society. That is to say, the subaltern has a position in society—it 
votes, fi gures in the census, and so on—but has no identity. Access to identity 
is barred because the foundational act of proclaiming identity, that is, as-
serting sovereignty through participation in the processes of signifi cation or 
othering of the Other, remains absent. Any discussion of “what does the sub-
altern want?” is therefore complicit in putting subalternity to crisis—the ques-
tion cannot be answered without speaking for or on behalf of the subaltern. 
Constituted by an “immense discontinuous network of political ideology, 
52. Stephen Morton, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (London, 2002), 114.
53. Žižek, “Left ist Plea for ‘Eurocentrism,’” 988. Emphasis added.
54. Ibid., 989.
55. Das, “Subaltern as Perspective,” 310.
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economics, history, sexuality, language and so on,” the subaltern remains 
outside and/or indiff erent to the mainstream.56 The social identity of the sin-
gulier universel authored in Žižek’s essay totally fails to consider the multi-
form plurality of this Other’s being and becoming.57 His universal is founded 
on a particular seeing of the Other and as such elides the very possibility of 
the Other’s plurality—the particular may exist adjacent to yet diff erent from 
the universal.58
To return to Žižek’s defi nition, the “nothing” who can conceive, com-
mand, and represent both their desired position (“we are the universal”) and 
the identity they demand (“we stand in as part of the no-part for true uni-
versality”) is not the true subaltern. The true subaltern’s position (without 
identity) in society is a result of a lack of access to class consciousness and the 
absence of “institutional validation” of this subaltern position—“subalterns 
remain in subalternity, unable to represent themselves”; incapable of mak-
ing their speech “count” or “hold.”59 By contrast, Žižek’s “nothing” is con-
versant with and recognized by the axiomatic structures of institutional poli-
tics. Consequently, the subaltern as the real no-part is always represented by 
somebody or something else—those claiming to stand in for the whole of the 
nonpart; that is, a new political party, the idea of class struggle, a western 
philosopher, and so on. Thus represented, the subaltern is always excised 
from representation.
Žižek’s characterization of “politics proper” as political confl ict between 
“the structured social body, where each part has its place, and the part of the 
no-part, which unsettles this order on account of . . . the principled equality 
of all men” is guilty of rehearsing the same excision.60 His reading of political 
confl ict as a moment of transition, of shift ing registers—the particular moves 
from its earmarked subordinate locus to the center whereby a part of the non-
part identifi es with the whole of society—is dependent on a series of gestures 
made by the dissenting Other. Signifi cantly, this Other feels the need to “pre-
sent itself” as a representative of the entire society, “demands to be heard,” 
and fi nally desires to “be recognized as a partner in political dialogue.” These 
conscious articulations of self-representation (for survival, love, and recogni-
tion) constitute the “elementary gesture of politicization”—the assertion of 
the part of the nonpart as the universal against the “particular power inter-
ests of aristocracy or oligarchy.” Political struggle is therefore “the struggle 
for one’s voice to be heard and recognized as that of a legitimate partner.”61 It 
is in eff ect a struggle for (self-)representation ordered around specifi c modes 
of engagement and a symbolic system guiding demands for recognition as 
legitimate. Žižek’s argument, then, rests squarely on the existence of a big 
56. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Subaltern Studies: Deconstructing Historiography,” 
In Other Worlds: Essays in Cultural Politics (New York, 1998), 281.
57. Žižek, “Left ist Plea for ‘Eurocentrism,’” 989, 991.
58. See Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” See also, Michèle Barrett, “‘Can the 
 Subaltern Speak?’ New York, February 2004,” History Workshop Journal 58 (Autumn 
2004), 359.
59. Spivak, Critique of Postcolonial Reason, 308; Spivak, “In Response,” 232–33.
60. Žižek, “Left ist Plea for ‘Eurocentrism,’” 988. Emphasis added.
61. Ibid., 989. Emphasis added.
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Other and an acknowledgement of this Other by both the parties. Is it diffi  cult 
to locate the excision of the subaltern in this nod to the Other? The appear-
ance of this Other at the horizon of a political struggle between the particu-
lar (as universal) and the universal (as particular) points rigorously toward 
Spivak’s contention regarding the inability of elite discourses to comprehend 
the subaltern’s speech. Žižek’s view that “politics proper” lays out the exact 
coordinates for the struggle leaves no space for the particular. Unnerving is 
the implication that revolutionary politics irrespective of their social and his-
torical contexts must conform to certain (read, “European” universalist) di-
rections. And equally off ensive is the suggestion that all revolutionary move-
ments must gain accreditation from this designated Other.
At this point I fi nd myself confronted with a series of questions. Who de-
cides what is legitimate? On what basis does the part of the nonpart claim to 
represent, fi rst, the whole of the nonpart and, then, the whole of society? And, 
what if the revolutionary goal of the nonpart lies not in claiming the universal 
but rather the particular, the local, the provincial? What if the subaltern par-
ticipates in a revolution against the “ruling oligarchy or aristocracy” but its 
vision is opposed to the universal except when encoded as such by those in 
positions of power (the colonizer, the colonial elite, the decolonized national 
bourgeois, and so on)? The point I am trying to make is this: it is impossible 
to understand and map the subaltern. It is impossible to situate subalterns 
through a universally valid template without fi rst peeling off  their particulari-
ties; that is, without judging their actions vis-à-vis a symbolic order that is 
not theirs to begin with. Žižek’s theoretical model for understanding “politics 
proper” is problematic because his ground rules deny the subaltern Other. (Or, 
does the subaltern refuse these rules?)
There is yet more proof for reading Žižek’s “plea” as a Eurocentric tem-
plate that evaluates, assesses, and, if found wanting, excises the particular. 
Consider for example his sweeping indictment of the whole of Japanese soci-
ety as “nonpolitical”:
Let us take an example from the opposite part of the world, from Japan, 
where the caste of the untouchables is called the burakumin: those who have 
contact with dead fl esh (butchers, leatherworkers, gravediggers), who are 
sometimes even referred to as eta, “much fi lth.” Even now, in the suppos-
edly enlightened present, when they are no longer openly despised, they 
are silently ignored. Not only do companies still avoid hiring them and par-
ents refuse to allow their children to marry them but, under the “politically 
correct” pretense of not off ending them, ignoring the issue is the preferred 
course. The recently deceased author Sue Sumii, in her great series of nov-
els, The River with No Bridge, used a reference to the burakumin to expose 
the meaninglessness of the entire Japanese caste hierarchy. Signifi cantly, 
her primordial traumatic experience was a shock that occurred when, as a 
child, she witnessed how, in order to honor the emperor, one of her relatives 
scratched the toilet he used to preserve a piece of his shit as a sacred relic. 
This excremental identifi cation of the burakumin is crucial: when Sumii saw 
her relative cherishing the emperor’s excrement, her conclusion was that, 
following the tradition of the king’s two bodies, in which the king’s body 
stands for the social body as such, the burakumin as the excrement of the 
social body should also be cherished in the same way. In other words, Sumii 
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took the structural homology between the emperor’s two bodies more liter-
ally and further than usual: even the lowest part, the excrement, of the em-
peror’s body has to be reduplicated in his other, sublime body, which stands 
for the body of society. Her predicament was similar to that of Plato, who in 
Parmenides bravely confronts the embarrassing problem of the exact scope 
of the relationship between eternal forms/ideas and their material copies: 
Which material objects are ontologically covered by eternal ideas as their 
models? Is there also an eternal idea of so-called low objects such as mud, 
fi lth, or excrement? However, the crucial point and the proof of the non-
 political, corporate functioning of Japanese society is the fact that, although 
voices like that of Sumii are heard on their behalf, the burakumin did not 
actively politicize their destiny, did not constitute their position as that of 
singulier universel, claiming that, precisely as the part of no-part, they stand 
for the true universality of Japanese society.62
For me, this passage raises more questions than it answers. What is the rea-
son for the thorough dismissal of the burakumin? What is the proof of the 
non political character of Japanese society as a whole? Just that that the bura-
kumin did not actively politicize their destiny! Why is the onus always on 
the Other to perform, to accept the invitation to identity, to do the right thing! 
Is the burakumin designated to the rubbish bin of history simply because 
Žižek’s example from “the opposite part of the world” does not fi t his thesis of 
what is “politics proper”? Or was this example from the opposite camp cho-
sen deliberately to authenticate the claim made soon aft er: “politics proper 
is thus something specifi cally ‘European’”?63 There is yet another important 
question, namely, how does Žižek know what the burakumin want? If the very 
axiomatic structures from within which the burakumin operate are closed 
to these subalterns, if there is no space in that system for subalterns to ar-
ticulate their desire, and if, more pertinently, subalterns are indiff erent to or 
even dismissive of that system which Žižek claims to be the defi nitive system 
of “politics proper,” then, is it possible to make overarching generalizations 
such as “the burakumin did not actively politicize their destiny”? I do not hear 
the subaltern any more or less than Žižek does, yet Žižek displays a sense of 
entitlement when speaking about them. Would it be wrong to identify this 
sense of entitlement as a sign par excellence of Eurocentrism?
The Repeated Invitation
The most problematic assertion in Žižek’s talk in Delhi was his invitation to 
the Other to embrace the universal. Those acquainted with his book First as 
Tragedy, Then as Farce, will recall a similar invitation that is extended at the 
conclusion of the work to all anticommunists: return to the faith, you are all 
pardoned and reminded that it is time to “get serious again.”64 But the invita-
tion extended in Delhi is far more disturbing because of the identity position 
Žižek claims in his address to the Indian audience: a European Lacanian-
Marxist seeking to revive the “legacy” of Europe and instruct and initiate the 
62. Ibid., 990–91.
63. Ibid., 991.
64. Žižek, First as Tragedy, Then as Farce, 157.
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wayward multitude of the Third World into a European universal. No wonder 
Menon found this gesture off ensive. For Žižek’s call to reject “the politics of 
identity” and his invitation to enter the universal is just a rephrasing of Eu-
ropean priority and privilege. As Menon puts it, “to insist that you cannot 
enter my drawing room at all and to insist that you are welcome to enter if you 
are civilized, wear a suit, know how to use a knife and fork” are of the same 
stock.65 Such an invitation functions by articulating an essential diff erence 
(“You’ve had your particularist stint, now is the time to return to the universal 
fold!”) by passing a sweeping judgment that the Other has failed to realize its 
potential (that is, to “actively politicize” its destiny). One cannot also miss 
the shared values between Macaulay’s invitation and Žižek’s. What is no less 
interesting is the repetition of the invitation—from Macaulay to Žižek (and 
from Žižek to the Balkans to Žižek to India). It is in this repetition that one 
must identify the essence of European discourse as it beholds the Other as 
well as the ambivalence underlying the authority of the European subject of 
enunciation qua his/her identity as the Subject. Homi Bhabha describes this 
duality thus: “[The] presence [of the Master’s discourse] is always ambivalent, 
split between its appearance as original and authoritative and its articulation 
as repetition and diff erence.”66 In other words, Žižek’s discourse in Delhi, and 
his invitation to the particular to join the universal, is neither original—its 
precedents pepper almost the entirety of European colonial discourse—nor is 
it authoritative, since the very fact of repetition dissolves authority by binding 
it to a compulsion to repeat. Repetition attests to the fact that the Other “which 
has not been understood . . . reappears.”67 Repetition is symptomatic of the 
failure to grasp the Other in its multiform plurality. The Other remains neither 
buried nor erased, “never entirely on the outside or implacably oppositional,” 
but always as “a pressure, and a presence, that acts constantly, if unevenly, 
along the entire boundary of authorization” compelling the Subject in eff ect 
to repeat invitations.68
This pattern and habit of thought is evident when we compare Žižek’s 
views on India with his pronouncements on the Balkans. I will not under-
take an extensive review of Žižek’s views on the Balkans, but the contours 
of his beliefs can be easily ascertained from the work done by Dušan Bjelić, 
Tomislav Longinović, and Nataša Kovačević.69 As a comparatist, I fi nd their 
writings most interesting, especially in relation to Menon’s views on Žižek. 
Bjelić, for instance, contends that Žižek’s careful construction of an image of 
Balkan-Europe, or the Balkans as Europe, refl ects an attempt to dissolve and 
65. Menon, “The Two Zizeks.”
66. Bhabha, “Signs Taken for Wonders,” 153.
67. Sigmund Freud, “Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year-Old Boy” (1909), in J. Stratchey, 
ed., The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud (London, 1955), 10:122.
68. Bhabha, “Signs Taken for Wonders,” 156.
69. I thank the anonymous reviewers for drawing my attention to these works. I am 
by no stretch of the imagination a scholar of Balkan history and culture, so I will merely 
highlight what more established scholars in the fi eld have observed and what most read-
ers of Slavic Review are well aware of. For a recent collection of essays examining Žižek’s 
representation of the Balkans, see the “special section” in Psychoanalysis, Culture, and 
Society 16, no. 3 (September 2011): 276–323.
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disidentify the essential cultural plurality of the region.70 Žižek, Bjelić notes 
elsewhere, “discursively links the Balkans to global capitalism and multicul-
tural democracy and thus circumvents Balkan exceptionalism” while advo-
cating a decoupling from particular “Balkan” local mores in favor of symboli-
cally assuming a European identity.71 It is precisely this failure to account for, 
theorize, and further problematize the subaltern or particular experience that 
I have been elaborating in my current exegesis of Žižek’s text(s) on universal-
ism. Reading these critiques, I am continually reminded of Spivak’s gloss that 
Europe’s “occasional interest in touching the other of the West, of metaphysics 
of capitalism, their repeated question is obsessively self-centered: if we are 
not what offi  cial history and philosophy say we are, who then are we (not), 
how are we (not)?”72 Or, as Su-Lin Yu puts it, Europe’s othering of its Other 
only makes the west’s “subjectivity possible.”73 Admittedly this brief compari-
son between the representations of the Balkans and the representations of 
South Asia in western epistemology is not enough to establish their respec-
tive conditions of otherness qua Europe. Yet it is exciting to note that sincere 
initiatives are underway to build a more comprehensive ground for compar-
ing these two geopolitical others.74 And as similar eff orts gather strength, we 
should be able to comparatively examine questions of modernity, Europe, and 
otherness more conclusively in the near future.
Conclusion: Žižek and the Future of Postcolonial Studies
Žižek is not alone in fi nding fault with the current directions and dispensa-
tions of postcolonial studies. Arif Dirlik, Aijaz Ahmad, and Ania Loomba have 
all variously drawn attention to the need for postcolonial studies to be re-
envisioned in the present.75 In fact, the “death” of postcolonial studies has 
70. Dušan Bjelić, “The Balkans: Radical Conservatism and Desire,” South Atlantic 
Quarterly 108, no. 2 (Spring 2009): 286.
71. Dušan Bjelić, “Is the Balkans the Unconscious of Europe,” Psychoanalysis, Cul-
ture, and Society 16, no. 3 (September 2011): 315, 321–22.
72. Spivak, In Other Worlds, 188–89.
73. Su-Lin Yu, “Reconstructing Western Female Subjectivity: Between Orientalism 
and Feminism in Julia Kristeva’s About Chinese Women,” Jouvert 7, no. 1 (Autumn 2002), 
at english.chass.ncsu.edu/jouvert/v7is1/slyu.htm (last accessed 19 July 2013). Emphasis 
in the original.
74. The department of Slavic and East European Languages and Cultures at Ohio State 
University is organizing the 2013–2014 Sawyer Seminar on the topic of “Language, Poli-
tics, and Human Expression in South Asia and the Balkans: Comparative Perspectives.” 
This “year-long Sawyer Seminar will focus on the intersection of language, politics, and 
human expression in two geopolitically key regions of the world—the Balkans and South 
Asia. The unique yet similar interplay of language, nationalism, ideology, and religion 
with literature, fi lm, and other forms of expression within each of these regions compels 
us toward a comparative approach. The juxtaposition of the Balkans and South Asia, we 
suggest, will off er academics and policy-makers a transnational perspective on the re-
lationships between culture and politics.” Emphasis added. See slavic.osu.edu/sawyer-
seminar (last accessed 19 July 2013).
75. Arif Dirlik, The Postcolonial Aura: Third World Criticism in the Age of Global Capi-
talism (Boulder, Colo., 1997), and Dirlik, Postmodernity’s Histories: The Past as Legacy 
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also been announced.76 Similarly, Partha Chatterjee struck the death knell 
for subaltern studies in his 2012 essay “Aft er Subaltern Studies.”77 Yet none 
except Žižek has moved over the years from critiquing postcolonial studies 
to unequivocally abusing the fi eld as well as those working in it. In his 2002 
essay “A Plea for Leninist Intolerance,” Žižek off ers a thought-provoking as-
sessment of postcolonial studies as “culture studies chic.” Admitting that the 
issues raised by postcolonialism are “undoubtedly crucial,” he goes on to say 
that “postcolonial studies tends to” gravitate toward emphasizing
the colonized minorities’ right to narrate their victimizing experience, of the 
power mechanisms that repress otherness, so that, at the end of the day, we 
learn that the root of postcolonial exploitation is our intolerance toward the 
Other and, furthermore, that this intolerance itself is rooted in our intoler-
ance toward the “Stranger in Ourselves,” in our inability to confront what we 
repressed in and of ourselves. Thus the politico-economic struggle is thus 
imperceptibly transformed into a pseudopsychoanalytic drama of the sub-
ject unable to confront its inner traumas.78
In the course of a decade, Žižek has unfortunately veered from logically 
evaluating postcolonial studies to stating: “If you mention the phrase ‘post-
colonialism,’ I say, ‘Fuck it!’ Postcolonialism is the invention of some rich guys 
from India who saw that they could make a good career in top Western uni-
versities by playing on the guilt of white liberals.”79 One wonders what could 
have led him to this. (I am, however, happy to see Žižek acknowledge race as 
crucial for understanding the dispensations of global capitalism in the era of 
the postcolonial critic).80 In any case, I prefer Žižek’s 2002 critique as impor-
tant for the future of postcolonial studies and for the work that postcolonial 
scholars do and ought to do in the era of globalization and American multi-
culturalism. For this reason I prefer to identify Žižek as an intellectual in-
terlocutor whose criticism might allow postcolonialists to fi nd better traction 
and Project (Lanham, Md., 2000); Aijaz Ahmad, In Theory: Classes, Nations, Literatures 
(London, 1992); Ania Loomba, Colonialism/Postcolonialism (London, 1998).
76. Editor’s Column, “‘The End of Postcolonial Theory?’ A Roundtable with Sunil 
Agnani, Fernando Coronil, Gaurav Desai, Mamadou Diouf, Simon Gikandi, Susie Tharu, 
and Jennifer Wenzel,” PMLA 122, no. 3 (May 2007): 633–51. Cited in Young, “Postcolonial 
Remains,” 19–42.
77. Partha Chatterjee, “Aft er Subaltern Studies,” Economic and Political Weekly, 47, 
no. 35, (September 2012): 44–49.
78. Žižek, “Plea for Leninist Intolerance,” 545–46.
79. See Engelhart, “Slavoj Žižek.”
80. Critics of postcolonial studies can also be critics of Eurocentrism. Rajiv Malhotra, 
for instance, has this to say about Homi Bhabha: “Harvard University’s Homi Bhabha is 
a role model hoisted by the American establishment for young Indian-Americans in Eng-
lish Departments and Postcolonial Studies to emulate. He has proven himself as having 
the ‘white gaze.’ This is the liberal path to becoming white.” A vocal critic of Eurocen-
trism and an avid advocate of Hindu-Indian identity, Malhotra should rightly be at the 
crosshairs of Žižek’s critique. But he shares with Žižek the latter’s distrust of postcolonial 
studies. Speak of unequal partners! See Rajiv Malhotra, “The Whitewashing of Bobby Jin-
dal,” Huffi  ngton Post, 31 January 2013, at www.huffi  ngtonpost.com/rajiv-malhotra/bobby-
 jindal-race_b_2588700.html (last accessed 19 July 2013).
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in their examinations of the current conditions of globality. While agreeing 
with Sandro Mezzadra and Federico Rahola that Žižek appears to understand 
postcolonialism as “merely the global projections of multiculturalism” and 
identity politics, I also fi nd similarities between his methodology for study-
ing culture and the framework employed by postcolonial studies to unravel 
excised histories, voices, and subjectivities.81 In this context, the postcolonial 
framework of analysis is far from obsolete in today’s era of multiculturalism. 
Confronted with rehearsals of the conditions of postcolonial time (marked by 
Fanonian binarism) in the era of global time (marked by multiculturalism)—a 
phenomena to which Žižek has oft en drawn our attention—postcolonial stud-
ies retains the methodological acumen to continue examining the politics 
of invisibility, unreadability, and revisionism in the logic and structure of 
 twenty-fi rst-century discourses.82
The fi nal point that needs to be clarifi ed here is that the postcolonial em-
phasis on the “ethics of alterity” is not equivalent to participating in identity 
politics, as Žižek has most oft en accused postcolonial critics of doing. An “eth-
ics of alterity” serves instead to expose the processes through which “Europe” 
constitutes its imaginary sovereign subjectivity by defi ning the non-west as 
lacking.83 I have no hesitation in accepting Žižek’s point that “identity politics 
involves the logic of ressentiment, of proclaiming oneself a victim and expect-
ing the dominant social Other to pay for the damage.”84 Indeed, such a gesture 
keeps alive the sovereign Subject of the west by imagining it as the symbolic 
Other. Put diff erently, whether the west represents the non-west or the non-
west asserts its identity against the west, the west as the fulcrum of discourse 
is never compromised. In the end, therefore, irrespective of whether the west 
stands at the opening of a narration or at the (receiving) end, it is always in 
the position of the S/subject of the narrative. The real task consequently is to 
focus on the predicate in order to analyze the structure of the subject through 
examinations of the continuous “worldling” of the “non-west” as contiguous 
to assertions and reinventions of Europe’s (universal) sovereignty, and the 
resistant character of the particular, or that particular which falls off  the map 
of discourse, thus constituting itself as an aporia in narratives of subjectivity 
or identity. The particular is that hole in the symbolic text of Europe’s self-
narrative which Europe cannot be rid of so easily.
81. On the question of the rejection of multiculturalism and identity politics, see Mez-
zadra Rahola, “Postcolonial Condition,” as well as Menon, “The Two Zizeks.” On the simi-
larities between Žižek and postcolonial studies, see Almond, “Anti-Capitalist Objections 
to the Postcolonial.”
82. Mezzadra Rahola, “Postcolonial Condition”; Young, “Postcolonial Remains,” 22.
83. Spivak, Critique of Postcolonial Reason, x, 199.
84. Žižek, “Left ist Plea for ‘Eurocentrism,’” 1006.
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